







During the past 20 or more years change and ferment has invigorated
the study of the past. New approaches to historical inquiry have been
advocated and pursued, historians have developed new interest in
formerly neglected areas, and practitioners of other disciplines have
begun to show renewed interest in using a historical dimension in their
research. The contributors to this special issue reflect on these and related
developments. Their reflections, however, incorporate several disci-
plinary perspectives and are cast in terms of the participants’ own
research and intellectual orientations. This essay is not an introduction
to this issue. Rather we have taken it as an opportunity to consider
recent developments from our own perspective and to state our own
views and conclusions, even though they are incomplete and, perhaps
also, deviant from the views of others, including some of the contribu-
tors, who have been no less involved in the agitations, explorations, and
achievements of the last two decades. We are concerned here with the
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emergence of social-scientific approaches to historical inquiry. More
specifically, we are interested in assessing the degree to which recent
developments in the historical discipline and in the related social
sciences look toward a mode of historical inquiry which promises to
contribute to scientific knowledge of human behavior.
Social scientists of the 1940s and 1950s tended to neglect the past
as a locus of scientific inquiry. And by social scientists we mean scholars
of any disciplinary orientation who try to identify regularities and
uniformities in human affairs through the use of empirical methods and
who seek to develop theoretical formulations that link together and
explain those regularities. Obviously, social scientists so defined have
not completely ignored historical inquiry. Economists have long
shown a pronounced, but by no means dominant, interest in the
scientific investigation of historical trends and patterns and other long
standing examples of scientifically oriented historical inquiry are to be
found in such social-science disciplines as demography.
Yet, it is also clear that the scholars who contributed to the emer-
gence of self-conscious and aggressive dedication to the development of
a science of human behavior in psychology, sociology, and political
science focused primarily on contemporary events and subjects. Indeed,
rejection of historical inquiry, of the historical method, and of histori-
cal, or genetic, explanations of human behavior, was a major element
in the behavioral revolution in these disciplines. The behavioralists
emphasized methods of data collection-personal interviews, question-
naires, sample surveys, laboratory experiments, and other methods of
direct observation-that could not be employed in the study of the
historical past. Such methods of data collection came to be identified
with scientific modes of inquiry and since they could not be applied
to the study of history, many behavioralists concluded that it was
impossible to study history scientifically.
This is not to say, of course, that systematic investigation of the past
was neglected by historians. System, rigor, and discipline are hallmarks
of historical inquiry. But the traditional approaches of historians were
not oriented toward identification and study of empirical regularities
nor toward the development of theoretical formulations. Indeed,
professional historians tended to deny the existence-or, at least, the
importance-of regularities in human behavior and to assume an
explicitly atheoretical posture. Most historians rejected, often with
derision, the possibility and desirability of a science of human behavior.
Major signs of change have become apparent in all of these respects.
Social scientists have developed a new, although by no means domi-
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nant, interest in historical phenomena. We do not intend to explore the
reasons for this reorientation. Obviously, however, it reflects interest
in understanding long-term processes that cannot be examined in the
context of a single, limited temporal era. We can also surmise that this
change in focus reflects concern for the generality of findings and con-
ceptual and theoretical formulations based on essentially cross-
sectional investigations of a single time period. Thus, increasing
numbers of researchers apparently have recognized that examination
and comparison of the events and processes of even temporally remote
eras can provide a means to refine, test, and generalize conceptual and
theoretical formulations. And we can also suspect that greater aware-
ness of the frailties of even such powerful methods of data collection
as the sample survey has developed.
But we are more concerned here with developments within the his-
torical discipline. From our point of view, the most striking develop-
ment of the 1960s and 1970s was the growth and advocacy of a variety
of new histories. It is difficult to trace the development of these new
scholarly preoccupations of historians, and indeed some innovations
were less new than their advocates suggested.
It is also difficult, or impossible, to identify common denominators,
although several dominant themes in the new histories do stand out.
One such tendency was the injunction to study the politics, society, and
economy of the past from the perspective of the grassroots-to examine
the history of ordinary people, of minorities, blacks, women, and other
formerly neglected groups. The past, in other words, was to be studied
from &dquo;the bottom up.&dquo; Such admonitions and efforts illustrated, in the
view of some, an egalitarian or leftist bias that paralleled movements
of the time. But whatever is to be said of ideological roots, the new
emphasis marked a welcome departure from the elitist orientation of
more traditional history. And there were other implications as well.
Not the least of these, in our view, was the impetus that these new pre-
occupations provided to the use of formerly neglected categories of
source material and to the application of new methods and concep-
tualizations.
A second and related characteristic of the new histories was their
affinity with the related social sciences. That affinity was illustrated
particularly well in the new economic history, or &dquo;cliometrics,&dquo; where
the debt to contemporary economic theory and method was both heavy
and explicit. The relations between the new histories and the social
sciences were most clear in the area of method. Here quantification
became the rallying cry. Research at the grassroots or among the rank
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and file involved the use of source materials-census records, bio-
graphical sketches, wills, city directories, election returns, and the
like-that are massive in volume but low in the amount of information
to be extracted from any individual item. To arrange, organize, man-
ipulate, and comprehend massive arrays of data extracted from such
sources required the use of statistical, electronic, and mechanical tools,
and the value of such devices was emphasized by the successes which the
related social sciences had already achieved through their use.
It would, of course, be erroneous to suggest that the historians of the
1950s and 1960s were the first members of their discipline to use quanti-
tative methods and source materials. As Robert W. Fogel (1975) has
pointed out, historians have always quantified both explicitly and
implicitly, and students of other and more quantitatively oriented
disciplines have always studied the past. Various historians, perhaps
in search of legitimacy, have identified the beginnings of modern,
quantitative historical research in the writings of A. Lawrence Lowell,
Orin Libby, Charles Beard or Frederick Jackson Turner, among
American historians; with the Annales school in France; or with Buckle
and Namier on the British side and other beginning points of equal
plausibility could be suggested. Although interesting, the origins of
movements are less important than their substantive manifestations
and results.
THE NEW QUANTITATIVE HISTORY
Since approximately the mid 1950s a growing minority of profes-
sional historians have self-consciously employed quantification in their
research and advocated its use in their writings and teaching, sometimes
with a certain revolutionary fervor. Moreover, many historians-both
quantifiers and their critics-as well as observers outside the discipline,
have seen the use of quantitative methods and materials as the primary
point of intersection between the historical discipline and the related
social sciences. Many have interpreted the growing use of quantifica-
tion among historians as evidence that the history discipline was
moving toward a legitimate place among the social sciences. That we
believe to be a rather naive view of the situation.
Technical skill and expertise in the use of quantitative methods and
materials have varied widely among the new historians. However, it
is clear that in these terms the new economic historians have been in a
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class by themselves. Blessed by relatively rich lodes of relevant data
and trained and working in the tradition of a social science whose
members have long employed quantitative approaches within rela-
tively sophisticated theoretical frameworks, the cliometricians enjoyed
a considerable advantage over other historians. Among quan-
titative historians concerned with political, social, urban, and demo-
graphic history, technical expertise in statistics and related areas
has been unevenly distributed. In the quantitative publications of
these historians, tables of raw numbers, unbenefited by any form of
standardization, now vie with complex equations. During the past 20
years, however, the modal level of technical expertise among this group
has steadily increased. A growing minority of younger historians have
received formal training in statistics and are joining an older and
largely self-trained generation, and indeed, a few historians are now
venturing in the direction of methodological innovation.
This is certainly not to say that an orgy of self-congratulation is in
order. The level of technical competence in statistics and related areas
is still abysmally low among historians compared to that of the related
social sciences. Courses in quantitative methods for historians, vari-
ously labeled, have appeared in history departments throughout the
nation, although many such courses disseminate more misinformation
than sound training. Even so, conditions have improved. Much of the
early mystified awe with which the computer was held has now dissi-
pated, although a few still see it as a substitute for cerebration; some
of the worst statistical blunders have disappeared from the literature;
the untutored historian at least runs the risk of informed criticism; and
a literature marked by considerable technical sophistication and
complexity is now appearing.
The modest improvement of technical sophistication has been
greeted with mixed reactions. Neanderthal traditionalists, including
some who are ostensibly friendly critics, insist that jargon and an
excessive reliance on numbers is destroying the literary quality that,
they maintain with considerable exaggeration, has been a fundamental
characteristic of historical writing. Quantification, in their view,
dehumanizes history and substitutes tables of numbers for humane
understanding of the personalities of the past. Less paranoiac scholars
recognize that quantitative methods and materials have already con-
tributed to deeper and more precise knowledge and have allowed inves-
tigation of the conditions and behavior of ordinary men and women of
the past who were usually neglected by traditional historians. Thus,
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quantitative approaches have added a humane dimension to history
that traditional approaches with their exclusive dependence on elite
sources could not provide. These same historians, however, also express
concerned recognition that growing technical proficiency is leading
to a form of history that cannot be read effectively, much less critically
evaluated, by the technically untrained.
In some ways more surprisingly, the growing technical expertise of
quantitative historians has not enthused some of the founders of the
new history. These scholars have deplored what they see as an excessive
emphasis on quantitative methods. They have suggested, in effect, that
quantitative methods have become unnecessarily technical, that too
much concern has been directed to complicated varieties of mathemati-
cal analysis, and they have called for greater concern for theory. In their
more extreme form, these views seem to denigrate any concern for
matters of technique and to woefully neglect both the complexities of
quantitative methods and the hazards involved in their misapplication.
It is certainly true that historians have paid too little attention to
theory and it is equally the case, in our view, that elegant methods are
of little value without conceptual and theoretical formulations. On the
other hand, theories are also of little value without appropriate methods
to test and refine them. In these latter terms, the technical expertise of
historians is not only far too low for comfort but too low to justify
the view that concern for method has been excessive.
Indeed, it seems clear that while historians have recognized the
value of quantitative techniques, and have shown signs of increasing
proficiency in their use, they have not yet directed sufficient attention
to broader issues of methodology. In the main, the new quantitative
historians have been concerned with techniques of data analysis. Sub-
stantially less attention has been devoted to matters of conceptualiza-
tion, design, and measurement. As in the case of the other social
sciences, the problems that concern historians involve essentially
nonempirical concepts such as cause, force, and attitude. The conduct
of research requires that these concepts be translated into empirical
measures and indicators. In general, far too little attention has been
directed to these processes of operationalization and measurement.
Thus, popular behavior or the recorded votes of members of legis-
latures are treated as direct measures of attitudes; occupation or
income are taken as direct measures of social status; and causal
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relations are asserted without an appropriate test or analytical warrant.
Neglect of the &dquo;measurement gap&dquo; is, of course, particularly hazardous
in view of the paucity and inadequacy of historical-data sources.
Problems of conceptualization also occur m the tendency to select
inappropriate statistical models for data reduction and analysis. All
too frequently, statistical models are correctly applied in technical
terms but are inappropriate to the research problem or the historical
process of concern. Selection of appropriate analytical models requires
that problems and processes of concern be carefully conceptualized.
Otherwise, inappropriate statistical applications result.
The point can be made more generally. Despite the heavy emphasis
that the new historians placed on quantification, they were much less
quick to recognize the central importance of conceptual equipment in
their work. Contrary to a long-standing historiographical dictum, data
do not &dquo;speak for themselves.&dquo; Before the data can speak, concep-
tualization is necessary. Conceptual models, frameworks, and theore-
tical formulations are a necessary basis for assigning meaning to
observed statistical relationships and patterns and are required to
suggest relationships that ought to be present in relevant data if other
propositions are to be accepted. Despite the warnings of Potter (1963),
the new historians did not realize consistently that the necessity of
conceptual formulations-of generalizations-does not go away
merely because it is unrecognized. As a consequence, generalizations
and theoretical formulations, often drawn from the social sciences
absorbed in the sophomore year or from common sense, became the
implicit and, hence, untested covering laws that provided the real
structure of explanation in countless quantitative historical works.
The results of these failures were several. Scholars published exces-
sively empirical works in which quantitative data were marshalled in
impressive displays but the conceptual apparatus that gave them
meaning and that provided a reason for their display was simply
assumed. Investigators assigned substantive significance to particular
statistical relationships, but other possible associations went untested
or an equally strong relation was dismissed because of some implicit,
and untested, assumption or generalization. At another level, historians
have witnessed the collapse of superficially plausible and impressive
explanations of historical phenomena as implicit, explanatory gener-
alizations were revealed to be inadequate on prima facie grounds or
failed empirical test, as empirical indicators of underlying concepts
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were shown to be inadequate, or as analytical models were demon-
strated to be inappropriate.
It is certainly correct that the new quantitative historians have
given too little attention to theory. Yet their technical and, particularly,
their methodological and conceptual apparatus also remains inad-
equate to their needs. In reality, the appropriate formula for the future
appears to require simultaneous emphasis on technique, method, and
conceptualization as well as on the use and development of theory.
HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
As we have noted above, quantification has been seen by some as a
primary point of intersection between history and the social sciences,
and growing use of quantitative methods and materials by historians
has been taken as an indication that history is becoming a full fledged
social science. Nowhere was the tendency to confuse quantification with
social science more poignantly illustrated than in the remarkable
odyssey of many historians in search of financial support for research.
That wandering took them, figuratively, print-out in hand, to the new
National Endowment for the Humanities. There they were told that,
because quantitative in character, their work did not fall within the
legislative mandate of the Endowment and were diverted to the
National Science Foundation. There they found their work was equally
unwelcome. Confusion was compounded when they learned that
colleagues in other social science disciplines had received grants for
research that clearly involved historical investigation. They concluded
that they had been discriminated against because of their discipline
but, in simple terms, their proposed research was not scientific nor
calculated to contribute directly to scientific knowledge.
In the early days of the new histories, the use of quantitative
methods and materials was, as Thomas J. Pressly once put it, a form
of historical fundamentalism. The use of these methods and materials
reflected the historian’s professional obligation to use all relevant
sources, to employ all useful methods, and to cast sources in new ways
in order to marshall the best and most complete evidence and thereby
gain an improved understanding of the past. The goal was to bring
fresh evidence to bear on questions of long standing interest to
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historians-did the common man really participate fully in the politics
of the Jacksonian period, for instance, and this goal continues to
underlie much, if not most, of the work of the new quantitative his-
torians.
No objections can be raised to this form of history. The effort to
describe, explain, and reconstruct the past as an end in itself is legiti-
mate and laudable and in keeping with the traditional goals of histor-
ical inquiry. The use of quantitative methods and materials in the
service of that end is also in keeping with basic, and traditional canons
of historical inquiry and has obviously contributed in major ways to
new knowledge of the past. But two additional points need to be made.
In the first place, the goal of describing and explaining the past as an
end in itself in no way lessens the need for improved technique and
method nor does it mitigate the need for greater attention to theory.
Secondly, this goal is neither completely congruent with, nor does it
fully subsume, the goals of social science. To put the matter differently,
the use of quantitative methods and materials to describe, explain, and
reconstruct particular historical events and periods does not make
history a social science.
Readers of this volume will note that the authors of many of the
works discussed are not historians by discipline, illustrating the
growing trend in various social science disciplines to turn once more
to the laboratory of the past for evidence. As yet, however, the work of
such scholars differs rather markedly from that of quantitative his-
torians. The social scientists specify their theoretical concerns, while
historians are much more apt to begin with an introductory preamble
that describes the importance of the specific historical problem or the
specific historical question addressed in their work. But the differences
also involve the historian’s predeliction for the narrative form.
The narrative form of the historian involves not merely stylistic
format, primarily descriptive prose, but also the form of organization
that underlies such narrative. The basic organizing tactic of historians
is to describe the unfolding of events in chronological sequence and
there are sharp limits to the degree to which historians will play games
with the concept of time.
The work of the new quantitative historians, like that of other
historians, has tended to involve, as a central element, meticulous
effort to reconstruct past events, to describe what actually happened in
particular historical circumstances and to explain those happenings,
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usually in terms of individual motives and attitudes. In doing so,
careful regard is paid to chronological order and to specific context,
and the resulting description of past events is seen as an end in itself.
Historically oriented social scientists, on the other hand, are more
cavalier where temporal order and specific context are concerned.
Reconstruction of past events is not an end in itself; rather the past
is used as a source of data and evidence. Events, persons, and institu-
tions of the past and the present are classified and compared to develop,
test, and refine general statements about human behavior with much
less emphasis on the context of calendar time. This is by no means to
say that all social scientists, whether historically oriented or otherwise,
successfully or even consistently pursue these goals. It is to argue,
however, that identification of regularities and development of theore-
tical formulations are central goals of social scientific inquiry.
Viewed in these terms, and as others have pointed out, the new
quantitative historians, as other historians, must be seen as primarily
consumers rather than producers of generalizations and theoretical
formulations. As we have suggested above, the new findings which
quantitative historians have contributed do not rest exclusively on
rigorous analysis of hitherto neglected historical data. They rest as
well on generalizations and theoretical formulations borrowed from the
related social sciences or drawn from native common sense. Many
cliometric studies, particularly, illustrate the use of contemporary eco-
nomic theory to fit together and make sense of historical data. It has
been argued that in this process cliometricians torture both economic
theory and the historical data, but our point is only that such studies
use contemporary economic theory to reconstruct and explain the past.
In their efforts to answer long-contested questions in American
economic history, the cliometricians have only done in an explicit,
highly skillful, and rigorous way what historians have always done.
Historians frequently borrow-often implicitly, without explicit
acknowledgment, and perhaps without fully conscious recognition-
concepts and theoretical formulations from the related social sciences.
These concepts and formulations are then used to select, link together,
interpret, and make sense of the facts and events of historical situations.
In this way, it is possible to construct plausible, meaningful, and
intuitively reasonable descriptions of those situations. Although when
implicit, this borrowing process is objectionable from the standpoint
of verification and in terms of the need to distinguish between empirical
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fact, on the one hand, and concept and theory, on the other, the process
itself is not. Without it, credible historical accounts probably could not
be constructed. On the other hand, a history that only borrows concepts
and theoretical formulations from the related social sciences, and which
is neither intended nor designed to test and refine those theories or to
contribute to the development of theoretical formulations, can be
described at best as applied social science.
Viewed in the broadest terms, then, the past 20 or more years have
witnessed progress toward a more comprehensive history-a history
that takes as its purview a wider range of the varieties of past human
experience and behavior, that is concerned with formerly neglected
human institutions and processes, and which is not limited in its scope
to the few of power and position but which is concerned as well, and
perhaps primarily, with the conditions, experiences, and behavior of
the ordinary people of the past. It is a history that has grown in part out
of the traditional imperatives of the craft and which, in obedience to
those imperatives, seeks to use all relevant sources and all useful
materials. Thus, the recent past has witnessed increasing use by his-
torians of hitherto neglected sources and increased employment of the
methods and tools of quantification, and in the use of those methods
and tools the new historians have become steadily more rigorous and
more expert. The new historians have drawn on the related social
sciences not only for tools and methods but also for concepts and
theory which they have applied with increasing effectiveness to better
describe, explain, and understand the events and processes of the past.
While this borrowing process has too often been implicit, and general-
izations and theories have too often been unconsciously and naively
accepted, it is also possible to detect the development of a better
informed, more self-conscious, and more systematic effort to apply the
findings of the social sciences to the task of reconstructing and under-
standing the human past. This is not to say that the new history has
arrived. The new historians need to pay still greater attention to
technique and method and, perhaps above all, to theory and to the
conceptual and epistemological foundations of their work. But clearly
progress has been made.
And these may be aspirations enough. A more complete, more
comprehensive, more replicable view of the past that is at least consis-
tent with the theories and generalizations of the contemporary social
sciences would not be a trivial accomplishment. The new histories
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appear to be moving toward such a view, however halting their progress
sometimes seems. Yet the new histories remain primarily consumers of
generalizations and theories rather than producers. It remains to be
asked whether the study of the past can contribute to general and
scientific knowledge of human behavior?
HISTORY AS SOCIAL SCIENCE
We cannot review in detail the long and often tiresome debates over
whether history is or should be a science. Nor will we rehearse either
the sometimes quaint views of philosophers as to the nature of the
historical enterprise or the often naive and self-serving efforts of
historians to prescribe and dictate the boundaries of the historical
discipline. Rather, we will ask here only: can the study of the past serve
as a means to test, refine, and develop scientific theories of human
behavior?
From one perspective the answer to such questions is surely yes.
Countless generalizers and theorists have used, often to their peril, the
descriptions of past events provided by historians as grist for their
theoretical mills. But the implications of the questions are broader. We
must consider briefly the obstacles in the way of historical inquiry
directed to the development of scientific knowledge and ponder its
limitations.
Some of the obstacles in the way of such an enterprise seem amenable
to relatively straightforward solution-better training in statistics and
mathematics and in the tools of quantitative inquiry, greater and more
rigorous familiarity with the conceptualizations and theoretical formu-
lations of the related social sciences, and sensitive attunement to
problems of measurement and conceptualization. But reservations have
been raised on other grounds by individuals with impressive credentials
within the new history. One set of perhaps fundamental reservations
concerns intrinsic characteristics of the data available for the study of
the past. Some varieties of quantitative or quantifiable data exist in
embarrassingly massive amount, but more frequently the available data
are frustratingly fragmentary. For many aspects of past human activity
and for vast areas of the historical terrain, virtually no data exist
whether quantitative, quantifiable, or otherwise.
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Murray Murphey (1973) identifies eight types of data relating to
past populations of which only one category includes data equivalent in
completeness to that which social scientists concerned with contem-
porary phenomena can obtain. And, of the historical data available to
American historians, only the manuscript rolls of the federal census fall
into that category as Murphey views the matter.
Murphey lists five methodological problems which are confronted
in using historical data to &dquo;confirm law-like statements&dquo;-the prob-
lems of quantity, aggregation, sampling, informant bias, and measure-
ment. Quantity, aggregation, and informant bias are all characteristics
of sources that call for the development of techniques allowing the
evidence to be used for particular purposes with maximum facility or
confidence. Sampling, on the other hand, not only may be a device for
solving the problems posed by large quantities of data, but may, if
theories are developed appropriately, provide models or guidance
which allow more confident use of incomplete data. Although these
four issues are serious when viewed in their theoretical aspects, they
are less formidable than the general problem of measurement. Given the
categorization of data, described by Murphey, can accurate indices of
societal change be constructed? After a sophisticated review of the
current methods of historians, Murphey pessimistically concludes
(1973: 201 ) that present methods &dquo;for confirming general hypotheses
regarding past populations cannot meet the standards which now
prevail in the social sciences.&dquo;
The difficulties discussed tellingly by Murphey could be stated in a
variety of ways but they are major problems which cannot be ignored.
It is also possible, however, to argue that they may not be as funda-
mental as he sometimes seems to suggest. The view of the efficacy and
reliability of the data collection and measurement techniques of the
contemporary social sciences on which his critique of historical sources
rests seems excessively exalted. Social scientists-and, for that matter,
physical scientists in such fields as astronomy and geology-have
confronted similar problems and have developed at least limited strate-
gies for their solution. It is certainly the case, however, that solutions
to the problems Murphey identifies would require effort in new direc-
tions, and not only methodological research but also, for example,
research into such areas as the sources and nature of bias in historical
data and into the purposes and nature of historical information collec-
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tion, recording, and retention procedures. Above all, solutions would
require substantially more rigorous and more extensive methodological
training than historians now receive. And it may be that these problems
impose sharp limitations on the nature and extent of knowledge that
may be gained by empirical historical inquiry.
But if we assume for the moment that such difficulties are amen-
able in principle to at least partial solution, and the assumption is a
large one, we can ask what the characteristics of historical inquiry
devoted to development of general theories of human behavior might
be. It seems clear that the focus of historical inquiry would shift in
major ways. Meticulous reconstruction of past events and historical
situations would be geared to theoretical concerns. Topics and direc-
tions of research would be dictated by explicit theoretical formula-
tions. Substantial attention might be directed to classification of his-
torical events, individuals, institutions, and populations in terms of
characteristics relevant to particular conceptual or theoretical formu-
lations. Classic historical problems and questions that have long pre-
occupied historians would receive less attention; research topics would
be selected, instead, in terms of tensions within theoretical formula-
tions or as promising targets of opportunity to test and refine elements
of those formulations. And, it is likely that descriptions of past events
would be valued less as ends in themselves but would be seen instead
as means to more general, and more timeless, theoretical knowledge of
human affairs.
It is probable as well that such a history would be more modest
in its aspirations and pretensions than traditional history has been.
Historians of this persuasion might consider reconstruction of the
specific motives and feelings of long-dead individuals, however
interesting, as beyond the reach of empirical inquiry and better left
to the imaginative, intuitive, and evocative methods of poets, novelists,
and impressionistic historians. Such historians might not venture
into &dquo;moral and aesthetic realms,&dquo; seek &dquo;to comprehend the totality of
human behavior,&dquo; or attempt to grasp history as a &dquo;seamless web&dquo;
(Fogel, 1975). They might be satisfied with a more constrained and
contingent form of knowledge that was sharply limited by scientific
canons of verification.
A genuinely social-scientific history probably would be substantially
different from even the new history that is now emerging. It would be
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limited by characteristics of historical sources such as those described
by Murphey. Such a history would be more abstract and lack the rich
and evocative sense of time and place that characterizes traditional
historical narratives. Indeed, time and place might become little more
than variables that index change and cultural or national differences.
The goal of understanding and describing the past might recede to be
replaced by a more timeless, but nontheless provisional, theoretical
view of human behavior.
PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS
To assume that any significant number of historians are likely to
pursue a form of social-scientific history that even remotely resembles
that outlined above may be only to indulge in the wildest of flights of
fancy. The fact that a few historians and a large number of historically
oriented social scientists have advocated or already taken essentially
similar directions may only suggest the reaction of most historians: it
would not be history. But even if we consider the present state of the new
history and project an even modest increase in technical, methodologi-
cal and theoretical sophistication, which will surely occur, we can recog-
nize the likelihood of growing difficulties of communication, training
and orientation within the profession. If to this projection is added
development of interest in a genuinely social-scientific history, these
difficulties would obviously be aggravated.
Historians specialize in widely diverse temporal periods, historical
themes and problems, and geographic, cultural or national areas. But
aside from relatively rare subfields that involve esoteric languages or
ancillary skills, communication among historians even across bound-
aries of specialization usually has not been a serious problem. Histor-
ians traditionally have attempted to avoid-without complete success,
it should be noted-specialized terminology and have sought to com-
municate in the language of the literate layperson. Thus it has been
possible for historians to read effectively studies outside their fields
of specialization and transmit findings to their students in classroom
situations or even employ those findings in their own work. Since
traditional historical methods are relatively straightforward and, with
a few exceptions, do not vary from one subfield to the other, it is
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possible, at least to some degree, for historians in one area of special-
ization to critically evaluate work in other areas.
The new history seriously challenges this happy situation. For 20 or
more years, some historians have been publishing research which the
vast majority of their colleagues and history undergraduate and
graduate students cannot read and critically evaluate because of its
methodological and conceptual complexity. It is true that much of this
work has been of transitory importance. Such work, however, is
steadily growing in volume, it is of increasing technical, method-
ological, and theoretical complexity, and the findings are of mounting
importance. While sound scholarship and instruction dictate that it be
read and critically evaluated, the majority of historians are increasingly
ill-equipped to do so.
The research of the cliometricians is at present the most striking
example of the problem. The mathematical complexity of that work
transcends the training of most historians including many of the new
historians in other fields. The difficulty is not, however, simply a matter
of mathematics. Cliometric history is also grounded in contemporary
economic theory. Critical estimation and measurement procedures,
behavioral models, and basic assumptions which underlie the work of
the cliometricians are drawn from that body of theory. Thus, their work
of this type cannot be fully comprehended and its limitations and con-
tingent nature recognized, nor can it be critically evaluated without
some comprehension of economic theory.’
And the work of the cliometricians must probably be seen as a
sign of the times. As the new historians of politics and society come to
draw on the increasingly elaborate and complex conceptual and
theoretical formulations of the related social sciences, similar problems
of comprehension and evaluation will undoubtedly develop within I
these subfields of history. We can add to this situation the work of
historically oriented political scientists and sociologists which is
frequently more technically and conceptually complex than that of the
new historians. When the increasingly mathematical nature of the
related social sciences is also noted, it becomes obvious that historians I
face a major communications gap both within their own discipline and
in relation to other fields of inquiry.
The reactions of historians have varied. A few have attempted to
implement the Barzunian tyranny and have simply ruled, ex cathedra,
all such work, whether by other historians or social scientists, as out
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of bounds and not history. Others have simply ignored the whole thing
apparently in the hope or belief that it will all go away. More com-
monly, however, interested historians have merely accepted or rejected
the results of technically and theoretically complex investigations
without critical evaluation. In some cases, historians have merely
relied on the criticisms of alleged experts. But, supposed experts have
often not been particularly expert and their criticisms have sometimes
been dictated by a bias against all quantitative or theoretical work.
Many of the criticisms among the more advanced practitioners also
involve what amounts to fine tuning, which, although important and of
keen interest to the initiated, is sometimes couched in extreme or
polemical language that obscures the fundamental contribution of the
work under review. Unfortunately, unsophisticated historians have
sometimes taken such specialized criticisms as grounds for rejecting
important contributions.
A few historians have attempted to develop sufficient expertise in
technical and theoretical areas to allow them to absorb the findings of
new historians and social scientists into their classroom instruction. But
retraining programs are few and obstacles to participation in them
are many. To date, the National Endowment for the Humanities (the
official guardian of history) has given little recognition to the need of
even traditionally oriented historians to gain conversance with tech-
nical skills if they are to pursue their craft effectively. Thus, in substan-
tial numbers, interested and concerned historians who are motivated
by the traditional canons of their discipline are simply denied the
requisite tools to understand a growing body of literature that is rele-
vant both to their teaching and research.
Nor are the signs for the future particularly reassuring. Little has
been accomplished in providing training in quantitative analytical skills
for undergraduate majors in history. Some instructors in a few widely
scattered institutions have experimented with incorporating quanti-
tative laboratory-type projects into basic courses. As yet, however,
they have developed little in the way of effective teaching materials
for history that are comparable to those employed in the related social
sciences. Few, if any, history departments require or even strongly
recommend that their undergraduates acquire training in elementary
statistics.
The issue of obligatory statistics courses for undergraduate majors
in history is broader than this discussion suggests. Historians have
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long depended in an informal way on the related disciplines to provide
assistance in defining problems of interest. And much of this process
has gone on at the undergraduate level before history majors have
moved to the heavy specialization in history typical of graduate school
programs in this discipline. The failure to require statistics in the
undergraduate history curriculum means that large sectors of social
science offerings are now either closed to history majors or so intimi-
dating that they avoid them. Many history majors therefore choose
their electives solely in the areas of soft social science or in the humani-
ties and obtain an education that is unfortunately old fashioned and
incomplete.
The picture is different where the declining population of graduate
students in history is concerned. At this level of instruction, the number
of new historians and the weight of their publications has worked
to bring about some change in the curriculum. In many departments,
courses in quantitative methods for historians are being offered.
Frequently, however, such courses are offered by historians who are
only partially trained themselves or these courses are given over to
essentially remedial training. Graduate students are sometimes urged to
acquire advanced training in statistics and related areas in other
departments, but lack of prerequisites and the weight of other require-
ments frequently militate against this course. Thus it is still possible,
and even probable, that the neophyte historian will pass through both
undergraduate and graduate work in entire innocence of quantitative
training.
A new and more technically and conceptually complex form of
history has emerged and there are even signs of interest in a genuinely
social-scientific history. Yet historians and the historical discipline
have been slow to acclimate to these developments. Indications of
major cracks within the discipline have appeared as a consequence.
Many of the new historians have found greater communalities of
interest among colleagues in social-science disciplines than in their own
discipline. The situation has been aggravated by history editors and
reviewers who insist that the technical and theoretical apparatus, and
the results of supporting data analysis, be consigned to footnotes and
appendices, or even separate volumes, as a condition for publication.
Since these elements are intrinsic to their arguments and findings, new
historians have often turned to social-science publications and to
specialized journals and collections for which, in any event, the audi-
ence is likely to be more receptive and congenial. There is also some
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indication that quantitative and social-scientific approaches to history
are developing within, or migrating to, social science departments and
disciplines, as in economic history and, to a lesser extent, in the case of
demography as well. Whether the process will also occur in other areas
remains to be seen.
The social-scientific disciplines-and, for that matter, some of the
humanistic disciplines-grew out of history. The result of that seces-
sion, from some perspectives, was to leave the historical discipline as
only a residual congeries of the temporal dimensions of the seceding
disciplines. A further secession would look toward even greater trunca-
tion of the historical discipline, or even its demise.
NOTE
1. These problems are suggested by Peter D. McClelland (1973).
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